JNAMUN 2026

# THE SPECIAL POLITICAL AND DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE

SPECPOL

AGENDA ITEM:

Promoting the safe and fair use of nuclear energy around the world

USG: Ahmet Arda Yüksel
Chair: Leyla Çandar
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Letter from the Secretary General

Most honourable participants of Junior Nesibe Aydın Model United Nations 2026 (JNAMUN'26),

It is my great pleasure to welcome you all to JNAMUN'26, which is organized by the hardworking and talented middle school students of Nesibe Aydın Gölbaşı Campus. I extend my sincere thanks to our academic team, who have researched every detail with great care to ensure that you enjoy such a prestigious and diplomatic conference. I also offer my appreciation to our organisation team for planning activities that will allow you to build friendships and collaborate with fellow delegates while having an enjoyable and memorable experience.

As the JNAMUN'26 team, our mission is to support our delegates in every respect, to help you gain insight into diplomacy, to develop your public speaking abilities, and to strengthen your language skills. Another valued aspect of attending JNAMUN'26 is the opportunity to form lasting friendships and create memories that will stay with you. Both our academic and organisation teams have worked with dedication to offer you the most enriching Model United Nations experience possible.

*This year in JNAMUN'26 we are hosting nine committees which are **UNHCR** (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), **FAO** (Food and Agriculture Organization), **WHO** (World Health Organization), **UNESCO** (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), **CSW** (The Commission on the Status of Women), **UNICEF** (The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund), **DISEC** (Disarmament & International Security Committee), **ECOSOC** (Economic and Social Council), and **SPECPOL** (Special Political and Decolonization Committee). The agenda items for each committee have been selected in line with the policies of their respective United Nations bodies.*

We wish you an exceptional Junior Nesibe Aydın Model United Nations experience. As the JNAMUN'26 team, we look forward to meeting you and supporting you as you achieve your goals to the very best of your ability.

Best of luck,

Mustafa COŞKUN

Secretary General of JNAMUN'26

1. Introduction to the Committee

The Special Political and Decolonization Committee (SPECPOL) is the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. It deals with questions that sit between diplomacy and administration: decolonization and self determination, peacekeeping and special political missions, questions related to information, and the peaceful uses and governance of domains where politics and security overlap, including outer space. SPECPOL is not an enforcement body and it does not run nuclear facilities. Its value is political design: it shapes expectations, builds common language, and creates frameworks that help states coordinate when issues are too sensitive, too cross border, or too tied to sovereignty to be solved by one country acting alone.

SPECPOL's work often revolves around environments where trust is thin and institutions are under stress. That includes post conflict settings, disputed territories, fragile governance contexts, and regions where external support is needed to prevent instability from spreading. In those spaces, technical projects become political projects. Infrastructure, energy access, public services, and safety regulation are never purely domestic questions because failures can trigger displacement, conflict escalation, and regional insecurity. SPECPOL debates the conditions under which international cooperation is legitimate, transparent, and fair, and it pushes for mechanisms that reduce the risk that assistance becomes leverage, extraction, or a spark for disputes.

This agenda, "Promoting the safe and fair use of nuclear energy around the world (SDG 16)," fits SPECPOL because nuclear energy sits at a hard intersection of development, sovereignty, safety, and security. Nuclear power can expand reliable electricity, support industrialization, and reduce dependence on volatile fuel imports, but the downside risk is uniquely political: accidents erode public trust and destabilize governments, weak regulation invites corruption, and unequal access to technology can deepen global power imbalances. Even when a program is civilian, it creates governance pressure points that are directly relevant to SDG 16: licensing integrity, independent oversight, transparency, emergency preparedness, community consent, and regional confidence that nuclear infrastructure will not become a security threat.

SPECPOL's policy space here is about making peaceful nuclear energy cooperation politically sustainable. That means building rules and incentives that strengthen institutions rather than bypass them: independent regulators with real authority, anti corruption safeguards in procurement and contracting, credible safety culture requirements, public transparency that is more than press releases, and international cooperation that improves capacity in states with limited technical resources. It also means fairness, not just safety. Fairness includes equitable access to training and technology, financing models that do not trap states in dependency, meaningful inclusion of communities near sites, and governance standards that apply consistently rather than being enforced only against weaker states. In this committee, delegates should treat nuclear energy as a legitimacy test for institutions: the world does not get "safe nuclear" by declaring it peaceful, it gets it when oversight is trusted, standards are enforceable, and cooperation reduces political risk instead of exporting it.

Special Committee on Decolonization (C-24)

Officially called the "Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples". Better known as the "C-24".

Establishment
- Established by General Assembly in 1961
- Monitors implementation of *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* (GA resolution 1514 (XV))

Mandate
- Examine political, economic & other developments in Non-Self-Governing Territories (NSGTs)
- Review list of NSGTs
- Make recommendations to GA, usually in form of draft resolutions
- Hold annual regional seminars
- Hear statements on NSGTs by representatives & individuals
- Dispatch visiting missions to NSGTs

Membership (29 countries)

Current Bureau
Chair   3 Vice-Chairs   Rapporteur

Elected in February every year "on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, experience and personal competence."

Annual session
FEBRUARY   Opening session
MARCH/APRIL   Second meeting for decision on regional seminar
MAY   Regional seminar in Pacific or Caribbean
JUNE   Substantive session (2 weeks)

For more information, visit https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization

2. Introduction to the Agenda Item

"Promoting the safe and fair use of nuclear energy around the world (SDG 16)" focuses on the governance system that determines whether civilian nuclear power is a stabilizing development tool or a long-term security liability. Nuclear energy does not just "produce electricity." It creates a chain of high consequence decisions: site selection, licensing integrity, reactor design choices, operator competence, fuel supply, spent fuel management, emergency preparedness, cyber and physical security, and public communication. When that chain is strong, nuclear power can deliver a reliable low carbon baseload and strengthen energy independence. When it is weak, the risks scale quickly: accidents that destabilize governments, corruption in procurement and oversight, erosion of public trust, and regional fear that a civilian program could become a strategic threat.

The core challenge is that nuclear technology is dual-use in governance terms even when the intent is peaceful. Most nuclear power programs require international confidence that fissile material will not be diverted, that facilities are protected against sabotage, and that safety decisions are insulated from political pressure. The weak points are rarely the physics. They are institutions: regulators that report to political ministries, inspection systems that can be captured, contractors chosen for patronage rather than competence, opaque ownership structures, weak whistleblower protection, and emergency plans that exist on paper but fail in practice. Unlike many energy sectors, nuclear failures are not local management problems. They become cross-border political shocks through contamination risk, displacement, trade disruption, and the reputational spillover that can trigger domestic unrest and regional tension.

"Fair use" matters because nuclear energy is also a power and inequality issue, not only a safety issue. The global market is concentrated: a limited set of supplier states and firms control reactor exports, fuel services, and key components, which can create dependency, geopolitical leverage, and unequal bargaining power in contracts. Financing structures can lock newcomer states into long-term repayment, fuel take-back terms, or vendor-controlled operations that reduce true sovereignty. Fairness also includes who bears risk. Communities near plant sites, uranium mining regions, and waste storage locations often carry the environmental and health burden while benefits flow elsewhere. If participation is symbolic and compensation is unclear, nuclear projects become legitimacy crises even before a single kilowatt is generated.

Effective solutions treat nuclear energy as a system of prevention, verification, and accountability, not a prestige project. Safety requires independent regulators with real authority, enforceable standards, transparent incident reporting, continuous training, and a safety culture that survives political cycles. Security requires robust physical protection, insider threat controls, cyber resilience, and coordinated intelligence and law enforcement interfaces. Non-proliferation confidence requires credible safeguards, material accountancy, and international cooperation that makes diversion difficult and detectable. Waste and decommissioning require hard planning upfront: funding mechanisms, long-term stewardship, and clear legal responsibility rather than postponing decisions to future governments.

This agenda sits inside SDG 16 because nuclear energy succeeds only where institutions are credible. Peaceful nuclear expansion is not mainly an engineering contest, it is a governance test: can states run high-risk infrastructure transparently, resist corruption, protect the public, and cooperate internationally without turning energy into coercion. Delegates should aim for policies that make nuclear programs consistently safer and more legitimate by strengthening the entire governance chain: independent oversight, anti-corruption procurement rules, safeguards cooperation, emergency readiness, liability and compensation clarity, and equitable access to training and technology so "peaceful use" is both safe in practice and fair in power distribution.

3. Keywords & Definitions

1. **Nuclear Energy**

   Electricity or heat produced using controlled nuclear fission, typically in power reactors, with high energy density and low direct carbon emissions during operation.

2. **Civil Nuclear Program**

   A national system for peaceful nuclear activities, including power generation, research, medicine, and industry, governed by licensing, safeguards, and safety regulation.

3. **Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)**

   A facility where a nuclear reactor produces heat that drives turbines to generate electricity, supported by safety systems, security systems, and emergency planning zones.

4. **Reactor**

   The core system where fission is sustained and controlled, producing heat. Reactor types differ in coolant, moderator, fuel design, and safety features.

5. **Fission**

   A nuclear reaction where a heavy атом nucleus splits into smaller nuclei, releasing energy and neutrons that can sustain a controlled chain reaction.

6. **Chain Reaction**

   A self sustaining sequence of fission events. In power reactors it must be kept stable through control rods, coolant conditions, and engineered safety systems.

7. **Nuclear Fuel**

   Material used to sustain fission, most commonly uranium fuel pellets inside fuel rods, fabricated to tight quality standards.

8. **Uranium Enrichment**

   A process that increases the proportion of uranium-235. Low enriched uranium is used for most power reactors; higher enrichment raises proliferation sensitivity.

9. **Low Enriched Uranium (LEU)**

   Uranium is typically enriched below 20% U-235. Standard fuel for most civilian reactors and less proliferation sensitive than highly enriched uranium.

10. **Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)**

Uranium enriched to 20% U-235 or more. It is at high risk for proliferation and is subject to stricter controls.

11. **Spent Fuel**

Used reactor fuel that remains highly radioactive and heat generating, requiring secure cooling, shielding, and long term management.

12. **Fuel Cycle**

The full chain from uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor use, spent fuel storage, reprocessing or disposal.

13. **Reprocessing**

Chemical separation of spent fuel to recover usable materials (like plutonium) and reduce some waste volumes. It increases safeguards complexity due to separated materials.

14. **Plutonium**

A fissile material that can be produced in reactors. Civil separation and stockpiling raise proliferation and security concerns even when legal.

15. **Safeguards**

International verification measures to confirm nuclear materials and activities are not diverted from peaceful use, most commonly implemented through the IAEA.

16. **IAEA**

International Atomic Energy Agency. Sets global safety and security guidance, supports capacity building, and applies safeguards through inspections and verification.

17. **Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA)**

A legal arrangement between a state and the IAEA allowing verification of declared nuclear material and activities.

18. **Additional Protocol (AP)**

An expanded safeguards instrument giving the IAEA greater access and information to detect undeclared nuclear activities and improve verification confidence.

19. **Material Accountancy**

Tracking nuclear material quantities and movements to detect loss, theft, or diversion through records, measurements, and audits.

20. **Nuclear Security**

Protection against theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, and malicious acts involving nuclear or radioactive material and facilities.

21. **Physical Protection**

Security measures such as barriers, access controls, armed response, surveillance, and design features to prevent intrusion or theft.

22. **Insider Threat**

Risk posed by authorized personnel who abuse access intentionally or through coercion. It is a major concern in nuclear facilities due to high trust requirements.

23. **Cybersecurity for Nuclear Facilities**

Protection of digital systems that support operations, safety, and security, including isolation of critical systems and strict control of software and access.

24. **Nuclear Safety**

Prevention of accidents and mitigation of consequences through reactor design, operational discipline, maintenance, and oversight.

25. **Defense in Depth**

A layered safety approach using multiple independent barriers and systems so a single failure does not escalate into a severe accident.

26. **Safety Culture**

Organizational norms that prioritize safety over cost, speed, or reputation, including transparency, reporting, and learning from near misses.

27. **Independent Regulator**

A national authority that sets rules, grants licenses, inspects, and enforces compliance without being controlled by the operator or political ministries.

28. **Licensing**

Formal authorization for site selection, construction, operation, and eventual decommissioning, based on safety assessments, public consultation, and compliance.

29. **Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)**

A structured method to estimate accident likelihood and consequences by modeling failures and human factors, used to prioritize safety improvements.

30. **Severe Accident**

    An event involving significant core damage and potential large releases of radioactive materials, requiring complex emergency response and long term remediation.

31. **Emergency Preparedness and Response**

    Plans, training, drills, equipment, and coordination to protect the public during nuclear incidents, including evacuation, sheltering, and public communication.

32. **Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ)**

    A designated area around a nuclear facility where special preparedness measures are required due to potential radiological impacts.

33. **Radiation**

    Energy emitted as particles or waves from unstable atoms. Ionizing radiation can damage living tissue, so exposure must be controlled.

34. **Dose**

    A measure of radiation absorbed by the body. Safety rules limit occupational and public doses.

35. **ALARA**

    A principle meaning exposure should be kept as low as reasonably achievable, balancing safety with practical constraints.

36. **Radioactive Waste**

    Materials contaminated with radioactivity, categorized by activity level and half-life, requiring safe conditioning, transport, storage, and disposal.

37. **Low and Intermediate Level Waste (LILW)**

    Waste with lower heat generation, often from operations and decommissioning, typically managed via engineered storage and disposal facilities.

38. **High Level Waste (HLW)**

    Highly radioactive, heat generating waste, typically spent fuel or reprocessing waste, requiring long term isolation.

39. **Geological Disposal**

    Deep underground disposal designed to isolate high level waste for very long timescales using multiple engineered and natural barriers.

40. **Interim Storage**

   Temporary storage of spent fuel and waste, often in pools or dry casks, until disposal or further processing decisions are implemented.

41. **Dry Cask Storage**

   A method of storing spent fuel in sealed, heavily shielded containers after initial cooling, reducing reliance on pools and adding resilience.

42. **Decommissioning**

   The process of safely shutting down, dismantling, and releasing a nuclear facility from regulatory control, including waste management and site remediation.

43. **Decommissioning Fund**

   Money reserved over the operating life of a plant to pay for decommissioning and waste obligations, reducing future fiscal and political risk.

44. **Nuclear Liability**

   Legal responsibility for damages from a nuclear incident, including compensation rules, caps, and insurance structures that affect public trust and investment.

45. **Nuclear Non-Proliferation**

   Policies and verification intended to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons capability, including safeguards, export controls, and restrictions on sensitive technologies.

46. **Export Controls**

   National rules that restrict transfer of nuclear materials, equipment, and know how, using licensing and end use checks to prevent misuse.

47. **Dual Use Goods**

   Items that have legitimate civilian applications but can also support weapons development, requiring careful control and verification.

48. **Newcomer Country**

   A state developing nuclear power capabilities for the first time, often facing gaps in regulatory capacity, workforce training, and safety oversight.

49. **Vendor Build Operate Models**

   Contract structures where a supplier may finance, build, and sometimes operate a plant. They can speed deployment but raise dependency and governance concerns.

50. **Fuel Supply Assurance**

Arrangements that ensure reliable reactor fuel access, reducing the incentive for national enrichment programs while improving energy security.

51. **Energy Justice**

A fairness lens for energy policy focusing on who gets benefits, who bears risks, and whether decisions include affected communities transparently.

52. **Public Acceptance**

Social legitimacy for nuclear projects built through transparency, credible regulation, meaningful consultation, and trust in emergency and liability systems.

INTERNATIONAL DAY AGAINST COLONIALISM IN ALL ITS FORMS AND MANIFESTATIONS - 14 DECEMBER

" **The United Nations has been proud to accompany many Territories on their journey to decolonization and we pledge to continue that vital work.** "

21 May 2025

António Guterres

UN Secretary-General

DPPA

4. Historical Background

   After World War II, nuclear technology entered global politics as both promise and fear. The "Atoms for Peace" push in 1953 framed civilian nuclear cooperation as a way to spread development benefits while limiting weapons risks, and it helped lead to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957 with a mandate centered on peaceful use, safety, security, and verification. From the start, the international community understood an uncomfortable reality that still defines this agenda: nuclear energy is not "just another power source," because the same materials, expertise, and infrastructure that power reactors can create proliferation concerns if governance fails.

   From the 1960s into the 1970s, civilian nuclear power expanded rapidly in many industrialized states, while international rules evolved to keep peaceful programs politically credible. The central legal anchor became the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), opened for signature in 1968 and entering into force on 5 March 1970, which linked peaceful nuclear cooperation to non-proliferation commitments and verification through IAEA safeguards. This period established a basic governance bargain: states could pursue civilian nuclear benefits, but they would accept a shared verification framework so other states could trust that "peaceful use" was real, not a cover for weapons pathways.

The 1980s forced the world to treat nuclear safety as a cross-border governance issue rather than a domestic engineering matter. The Chernobyl disaster in 1986 showed how an accident in one state can create radiological, economic, and political consequences for many others, and it triggered a wave of international legal instruments under IAEA auspices, including conventions on early notification and on assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. The key historical shift was institutional: transparency, emergency communication, and mutual assistance became part of what "responsible nuclear energy" meant, because secrecy and slow reporting are not only bad governance, they amplify harm.

In the 1990s, states sought to formalize safety obligations through a standing treaty framework, not only crisis response. The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1996, creating peer review driven expectations for how countries should regulate the safety of nuclear power plants, including oversight, siting, design, operation, and emergency preparedness. This matters for "safe and fair use" because it pushed nuclear legitimacy away from one-off promises and toward repeatable national systems: competent operators, enforceable standards, and regulators that can say "no" without being punished politically.

From the 2000s onward, the nuclear agenda expanded beyond accidents and proliferation to include intentional threats. The growing focus on nuclear security treated sabotage, theft, and insider risk as governance problems requiring legal commitments and practical protection standards. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment became central as legally binding instruments on physical protection, with the Amendment entering into force in 2016 and extending coverage to nuclear facilities and domestic use and storage, not only international transport. The lesson of this era is blunt: even perfect reactor physics cannot compensate for weak security culture, corrupt access controls, or states that underinvest in protection because the threat feels abstract until it is not.

The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi accident triggered another global recalibration, this time toward stress testing, severe accident preparedness, stronger peer reviews, and a renewed emphasis on independent regulators and credible emergency planning. The IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety crystallized many of these priorities and drove updates to safety standards and support mechanisms for member states. Fukushima also reinforced a political reality that is central to this committee topic: nuclear energy survives only where public trust survives, and public trust collapses fastest when institutions appear defensive, opaque, or captured.

In the 2020s, two trends sharpen the link to SDG 16 and to SPECPOL's governance lens. First, nuclear energy is re-entering energy planning discussions in many regions for energy security and decarbonization reasons, including interest in new technologies like small modular reactors, which widen the set of potential adopter states and raise new regulatory, emergency preparedness, and supply chain oversight questions. Second, armed conflict has reintroduced a risk the post-Cold War world hoped to avoid: major nuclear facilities operating under wartime conditions. Since March 2022, the IAEA has framed nuclear safety and security in Ukraine through "seven indispensable pillars," highlighting how external power loss, disrupted staffing, damaged supply chains, and military pressure can compromise safety systems even when reactors are shut down. This is historically important because it shows that "safe use" is not only about design and training, it is about rule of law, protection of infrastructure, and the ability of institutions to function under political stress.

The historical arc points to one conclusion that delegates should carry into this agenda: global nuclear governance is a layered system built in response to repeated failures and near-failures. Peaceful nuclear energy became internationally acceptable not because the technology became harmless, but because treaties, safeguards, safety conventions, security obligations, and peer review practices created a framework where trust can be earned and re-earned. That is why SDG 16 fits: safe and fair nuclear energy is fundamentally an institution's problem, involving transparent oversight, anti-corruption procurement, enforceable standards, credible verification, emergency readiness, and international cooperation that reduces insecurity rather than exporting it.

5. Examples of the Topic

States and institutions use different approaches to make nuclear energy both safer and more legitimate, combining independent regulation, peer review, safeguards and security, fuel cycle restraint, waste solutions, and crisis transparency so nuclear programs do not become accident risks, corruption magnets, or regional security triggers.

In the European Union after Fukushima, regulators ran continent-wide "stress tests" and peer reviews to assess how plants would cope with extreme hazards, loss of safety functions, and severe accident scenarios, then used findings to drive upgrades. The lesson is that rare events stop being "unthinkable" when regulators force operators to prove resilience against low-probability, high-impact conditions instead of relying on historical averages.

Through the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions, plants invite international expert teams to review operational safety performance against IAEA safety standards and identify improvement actions and good practices. The lesson is that operational discipline and safety culture drift over time, so periodic external challenge helps catch complacency that internal metrics normalize.

Through the IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), countries benchmark their nuclear regulatory frameworks against international good practices to strengthen independence, clarity of authority, inspection capacity, and enforcement. The lesson is that "safe nuclear" is not only a plant issue; it is a governance architecture issue where weak regulators and political interference can undo even strong engineering.

Via WANO peer reviews, operators assess how decisions from headquarters to plant floor affect safety culture and reliability, using independent teams from other member utilities. The lesson is that high-risk industries improve fastest when operational excellence is treated as a shared professional standard, not as a national secret or a PR problem.

On physical protection, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material entered into force in 2016 and expanded expectations toward protecting nuclear facilities and domestic use and storage, not only international transport. The lesson is that nuclear security cannot be optional or purely domestic because sabotage and theft risks have cross-border consequences and demand common baseline obligations.

On implementation guidance, IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations such as INFCIRC 225 Revision 5 provide a shared reference point for designing national physical protection regimes for nuclear material and facilities. The lesson is that security becomes credible when states converge on common principles and design expectations, reducing weak-link vulnerabilities that adversaries can target.

For non-proliferation confidence and fairness in access, the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan provides a last-resort fuel assurance mechanism intended not to distort commercial markets, but to reduce incentives for states to pursue sensitive fuel cycle capabilities purely out of supply anxiety. The lesson is that shared fuel assurance can lower geopolitical pressure by separating "access to fuel" from "need to build enrichment."

As a newcomer model, the United Arab Emirates has been used by the IAEA as a case study for newcomers via infrastructure reviews, and it has emphasized sourcing fuel internationally and avoiding domestic enrichment as part of its non-proliferation positioning. The lesson is that newcomer credibility is built through restraint choices and transparent governance pathways, not slogans about peaceful intent.

On the hardest back-end problem, Finland's ONKALO project is an advanced example of deep geological disposal planning tied to long-term safety cases and national licensing reviews, aiming to move from "interim forever" to a durable disposal pathway. The lesson is that public trust improves when waste management is treated as an upfront obligation with institutions, funding, and a real end state, not as a problem postponed to future governments.

In wartime risk management, the IAEA has maintained continuous focus on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards in Ukraine and has stationed experts at sites including the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia plant, repeatedly highlighting how stable off-site power, staffing, maintenance access, and security guarantees are essential to avoid accidents even when reactors are not operating. The lesson is that nuclear safety depends on rule of law and infrastructure protection, and conflict can break safety pillars faster than engineering can compensate.

For incident communication, the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) was developed by the IAEA and OECD NEA to communicate safety significance consistently to the public. The lesson is that legitimacy collapses when information is confusing or politicized, so standardized, comparable reporting is part of safety governance, not an add-on.

6. Questions to be Addressed

1. How can states build genuinely independent nuclear regulators with the authority, funding, and political insulation to stop or delay projects when safety requirements are not met?
2. What minimum legal and institutional "readiness" standards should be required before a newcomer country can license construction, including workforce, emergency response, and enforcement capacity?
3. What baseline nuclear safety standards should be treated as non-negotiable globally, and how should peer reviews be used to verify real implementation rather than paper compliance?
4. Which measures most effectively reduce corruption risk in nuclear procurement and contracting, including open contracting rules, vendor vetting, beneficial ownership disclosure, and audit powers?
5. How should countries manage nuclear liability and compensation so the public is protected, victims are compensated fast, and operators still have clear accountability incentives?
6. What emergency preparedness requirements should apply for evacuation planning, drills, public communication, and cross-border coordination, especially for plants near borders?
7. How can states ensure resilient off-site power, backup systems, and severe accident management so loss of power and cascading failures do not escalate into disasters?
8. What cybersecurity standards should apply to nuclear facilities, including separation of critical systems, incident reporting, and supply chain security for digital components?
9. How should states design physical protection against sabotage and insider threats, including access controls, personnel reliability, and armed response integration?
10. How can states reduce proliferation risk while preserving fair access to peaceful energy, including fuel assurance mechanisms and limits on sensitive fuel cycle expansion?
11. How should spent fuel and high-level waste policy be structured from day one, including interim storage standards, long-term disposal plans, and protected decommissioning funding?
12. How should nuclear projects balance energy justice, community consent, and equitable benefit sharing, including transparency for siting decisions and local risk compensation?
13. How can progress be measured under SDG 16 with concrete indicators, including regulator independence metrics, inspection frequency, incident reporting quality, safeguards performance, cybersecurity maturity, and emergency drill results?

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