



JNAMUN 2026

THE DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

DISEC

AGENDA ITEM:

**Stopping the illegal trade of
weapons across borders to make
the world safer**

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United Nations
General Assembly
1st Committee (DISEC)





Letter from the Secretary General

Most honourable participants of Junior Nesibe Aydın Model United Nations 2026 (JNAMUN'26),

It is my great pleasure to welcome you all to JNAMUN'26, which is organized by the hardworking and talented middle school students of Nesibe Aydın Gölbaşı Campus. I extend my sincere thanks to our academic team, who have researched every detail with great care to ensure that you enjoy such a prestigious and diplomatic conference. I also offer my appreciation to our organisation team for planning activities that will allow you to build friendships and collaborate with fellow delegates while having an enjoyable and memorable experience.

As the JNAMUN'26 team, our mission is to support our delegates in every respect, to help you gain insight into diplomacy, to develop your public speaking abilities, and to strengthen your language skills. Another valued aspect of attending JNAMUN'26 is the opportunity to form lasting friendships and create memories that will stay with you. Both our academic and organisation teams have worked with dedication to offer you the most enriching Model United Nations experience possible.

*This year in JNAMUN'26 we are hosting nine committees which are **UNHCR** (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), **FAO** (Food and Agriculture Organization), **WHO** (World Health Organization), **UNESCO** (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), **CSW** (The Commission on the Status of Women), **UNICEF** (The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund), **DISEC** (Disarmament & International Security Committee), **ECOSOC** (Economic and Social Council), and **SPECPOL** (Special Political and Decolonization Committee). The agenda items for each committee have been selected in line with the policies of their respective United Nations bodies.*

We wish you an exceptional Junior Nesibe Aydın Model United Nations experience. As the JNAMUN'26 team, we look forward to meeting you and supporting you as you achieve your goals to the very best of your ability.

Best of luck,

Mustafa COŞKUN

Secretary General of JNAMUN'26



1. Introduction to the Committee

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, responsible for questions of global disarmament, arms control, non proliferation, and threats to international peace and security. Unlike bodies that run operations on the ground, DISEC is a norm setting and agenda shaping forum. It debates emerging security risks, drafts resolutions that guide international cooperation, and pressures states to align national policies with global standards. DISEC's work sits at the intersection of hard security and governance: how weapons move, who controls them, how states cooperate on enforcement, and how international rules reduce the ability of armed groups and criminal networks to destabilize societies.





DISEC addresses a broad spectrum of weapons and related security problems. That includes conventional arms and small arms and light weapons, ammunition supply chains, arms brokering, diversion from legal stockpiles, surplus stock management, sanctions and embargo compliance, and the role of technology in weapons manufacturing and trafficking. It also covers the institutional architecture that tries to contain these risks, such as transparency measures, confidence building, export control standards, and international reporting mechanisms. While DISEC resolutions are not legally binding like Security Council decisions, they shape expectations, drive technical assistance priorities, and often influence treaty negotiations, national legislation, and how other UN bodies coordinate responses.

This committee’s agenda, “Stopping the illegal trade of weapons across borders to make the world safer (SDG 16),” fits directly into DISEC’s core mission because illicit weapons flows are a multiplier for violence. Illegal trafficking sustains armed conflict, fuels organized crime, empowers terrorist groups, increases homicide rates, and weakens rule of law by corrupting border systems and security institutions. It also undercuts legitimate governance by making it easier for non-state actors to challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force. The problem is not only the weapons themselves, but the ecosystem that moves them: weak export controls, fraudulent end user certificates, corrupt customs processes, under secured stockpiles, porous borders, untracked ammunition, online facilitation, and profit incentives that reward diversion.



DISEC's policy space is therefore about building a chain of prevention, detection, and accountability across borders. That includes harmonizing export and transit controls, improving tracing and marking practices, disrupting arms brokering and financing networks, strengthening stockpile security and surplus destruction, enhancing customs and border interdiction capacity, improving international information sharing, and supporting justice systems so seizures translate into prosecutions rather than paperwork. SDG 16 matters here because reducing violence and strengthening institutions are inseparable: the world becomes safer not when a single shipment is stopped, but when systems make trafficking consistently harder, riskier, and less profitable. In this committee, delegates will design strategies that combine security realism with governance practicality, aiming for policies that can be implemented by states with very different capacities while still producing measurable reductions in illicit cross border weapons flows.





2. Introduction to the Agenda Item

“Stopping the illegal trade of weapons across borders to make the world safer (SDG 16)” focuses on the supply chain that turns violence from a local risk into a durable system. Illicit cross border weapons flows do not just “add more guns.” They extend conflicts, raise homicide rates, strengthen organized crime, enable terrorism, and make ceasefires and policing less credible because armed actors can rearm faster than institutions can respond. The most common drivers are not dramatic battlefield shipments. They are repeatable weaknesses: diversion from legal stockpiles, corrupt facilitation at checkpoints, weak export and transit controls, falsified end user documentation, poorly secured ammunition, and smuggling networks that already move drugs, people, and illicit goods.



The core of the problem is that legality is easy to fake and accountability is hard to enforce. Many illicit weapons start as legal products, legally exported, then diverted through re export, theft, battlefield capture, or “gray” brokers who exploit gaps between jurisdictions. Ammunition is the quiet enabler: even a small number of rifles becomes strategically irrelevant without sustained ammunition supply, yet ammunition often has weaker tracking, weaker reporting, and weaker stockpile management than the weapons themselves. Illicit flows also scale through modularity and concealment. Small arms and components can be shipped in parts, mixed with legitimate cargo, moved through free trade zones, or rerouted through multiple transit states to blur responsibility.



Technology and market adaptation add new layers. Online platforms and encrypted messaging lower the cost of connecting buyers, brokers, and transporters. Improved production and parts markets complicate enforcement, including unmarked or privately assembled firearms that lack serial numbers, and the spread of tools that make parts easier to produce locally. These trends do not eliminate classic trafficking routes. They multiply them by adding more entry points, more anonymity, and faster replacement cycles when interdictions happen.



Effective solutions treat trafficking as a system, not a series of seizures. Border interdiction is necessary but insufficient if the upstream pipeline remains intact. Prevention starts at the source with export licensing standards, risk based end use controls, and verification mechanisms that can detect diversion patterns before shipments move. It continues with stockpile security and surplus reduction, because poorly guarded arsenals, outdated inventories, and corrupt leakage are among the most consistent origins of illicit supply. It also requires forensic and trace capacity: marking and record keeping that allow recovered weapons and ammunition to be traced, and investigative cooperation that turns a seized shipment into network disruption, arrests, and asset seizures rather than a one time press release.



This agenda sits directly inside SDG 16 because weapons trafficking is both a violence problem and an institutional problem. Trafficking thrives where rule of law is thin, borders are under-resourced, and corruption is profitable. It also actively weakens institutions by funding criminal governance, intimidating communities, and incentivizing officials to participate rather than enforce. Delegates should aim for policies that make trafficking consistently harder, riskier, and less profitable by combining controls across the entire chain: production and export, transit and customs, stockpile management, tracing and investigations, judicial follow through, and international information sharing. The world becomes safer not when one route is blocked, but when the system stops being able to regenerate routes faster than states can close them.

3. Keywords & Definitions

1. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)

Small arms are weapons designed for individual use, such as pistols, rifles, and assault rifles. Light weapons are typically crew-served, such as heavy machine guns, grenade launchers, and portable anti-tank systems. SALW are the most common weapons trafficked across borders and are strongly linked to everyday violence.

2. Ammunition

Cartridges, bullets, shells, and explosives used to fire or operate weapons. Ammunition supply often sustains conflict more than new weapons, and weak controls on ammunition frequently undermine arms control efforts.

3. Illicit Arms Trafficking

The illegal movement, sale, or transfer of weapons or ammunition across borders in violation of national laws, embargoes, or international obligations, including smuggling, diversion, and unauthorized brokering.

4. Diversion

When weapons or ammunition legally produced or legally transferred end up with unauthorized users. Diversion can happen through theft from stockpiles, corrupt officials, re-export without approval, battlefield capture, or falsified paperwork.



5. **End User**

The final authorized recipient of weapons or ammunition, typically a government agency or licensed entity. Identifying the true end user is central to preventing diversion.

6. **End-User Certificate (EUC)**

A document stating who the end user is and how the weapons will be used, often required for export approval. Fraudulent EUCs are a common technique to disguise diversion.

7. **Arms Brokering**

Arranging or facilitating arms transfers between sellers and buyers, often across multiple countries. Brokers may not physically handle the weapons but can be essential to trafficking networks.

8. **Transit State**

A country through which a shipment passes en route to its destination. Weak transit controls and limited inspection capacity can allow illicit cargo to move with low risk.

9. **Transshipment**

Moving goods from one transport mode to another, such as ship to truck or aircraft to ship, often in ports or logistics hubs. Transshipment points can be exploited to relabel, reroute, or conceal weapons.

10. **Free Trade Zone (FTZ)**

A designated area where goods can be stored, processed, or re-exported with simplified customs procedures. FTZs can improve trade efficiency but can also be misused to obscure ownership and cargo origins.

11. **Customs Control**

Border measures to inspect, clear, and enforce laws on goods crossing borders. For arms trafficking, this includes risk profiling, inspections, seizures, and information sharing with law enforcement.

12. **Risk Profiling**

A method customs and border agencies use to target high-risk shipments using intelligence and indicators such as routing anomalies, suspicious documentation, or known front companies.



13. **Marking**

Applying unique identifiers to firearms, such as serial numbers and manufacturer marks, to support tracing. Weak or missing marking enables “untraceable” circulation.

14. **Record-Keeping**

Maintaining data on manufacture, import, export, ownership, and transfers. Without records, seizures cannot be connected to sources and networks.

15. **Tracing**

The systematic tracking of a recovered weapon or ammunition item through official records to identify its origin, chain of custody, and likely diversion point.

16. **Chain of Custody**

Documented control of seized items from the point of recovery through storage and court proceedings. Broken chains of custody can collapse prosecutions.

17. **Stockpile Management**

Safe storage, inventory control, and physical security of weapons and ammunition held by military, police, or other authorized institutions. Poor stockpile management is a major driver of diversion.

18. **Surplus Weapons**

Weapons and ammunition held in quantities beyond operational needs. Surplus stock increases leakage risk and is often addressed through secure destruction programs.

19. **Brokering Controls**

National rules requiring brokers to register, obtain licenses, and report activities. Effective controls close gaps where brokers operate across jurisdictions.

20. **Export Control**

A legal and administrative system that regulates the export of military items, including licensing, risk assessment, and conditions tied to end use and human rights.

21. **Catch-All Controls**

Rules that allow authorities to require authorization for items not explicitly listed when there is a risk they could support prohibited military use or diversion.

22. **Embargo**

A restriction, often imposed by the UN Security Council or by regional bodies, that prohibits arms transfers to specific states or non-state actors. Embargo violations are a common trafficking route.



23. Sanctions Evasion

Techniques used to bypass embargoes and restrictions, including front companies, false manifests, rerouting, and using intermediaries.

24. Front Company

A business that appears legitimate but is used to hide the real buyers, sellers, or financial flows behind weapons shipments.

25. False Manifest and Misdeclaration

Lying on shipping documents about cargo type, quantity, value, or destination. This is a frequent method to conceal weapons in commercial trade.

26. Smuggling Route

A repeated corridor used to move illicit goods across borders, often protected by corruption, violence, or community dependence on smuggling income.

27. Corruption

Abuse of authority for private gain, such as accepting bribes to allow shipments through, issuing licenses unlawfully, or “losing” inventory records. Corruption is a primary enabler of illicit weapons flows.

28. Financial Flows

Payments, money transfers, and trade-based laundering that fund trafficking. Disrupting finance can be more effective than chasing individual shipments.

29. Asset Seizure and Forfeiture

Legal tools to confiscate proceeds and property linked to trafficking networks. These tools target profit incentives and can degrade network capacity.

30. Organized Criminal Group

A structured group committing serious crimes for profit. Many groups diversify across trafficking markets, making weapons part of broader smuggling ecosystems.

31. Non-State Armed Group

An armed actor not formally part of a state’s security forces, such as insurgents, militias, or extremist groups. Access to illicit weapons increases their operational capacity.

32. Arms Components

Parts such as barrels, receivers, slides, magazines, and trigger assemblies. Traffickers may ship components separately to reduce detection and to assemble weapons later.



33. **Unmarked Firearms**

Weapons lacking serial numbers or with removed or altered identifiers. These are harder to trace and often used to reduce prosecution risk.

34. **Evidence-Based Interdiction**

Border and policing actions guided by intelligence, risk data, and patterns rather than random checks. This improves seizure rates while limiting disruption to legitimate trade.

35. **Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)**

Formal cooperation between states to gather evidence, share records, and support prosecutions across borders. Weak MLA slows network disruption.

36. **Information Sharing**

Exchange of intelligence, seizure data, tracing results, and risk indicators between agencies and states. Without sharing, traffickers exploit jurisdictional blind spots.

37. **Small Arms Control Measures**

A package of policies such as marking, tracing, licensing, stockpile security, and destruction of surplus, designed to reduce diversion and misuse over time.





4. Historical Background

After World War II, the UN system treated weapons flows as a direct threat to international peace and to state sovereignty. The General Assembly created its First Committee, now known as DISEC, to debate disarmament and international security because leaders understood a simple pattern: when arms move faster than diplomacy, conflicts last longer and spill across borders. During the early Cold War, attention focused heavily on nuclear risk, but conventional weapons and ammunition quietly expanded across proxy wars and newly independent states, often with limited export controls and weak stockpile management. That era established two truths that still shape this agenda: most weapons used in violence are conventional, and many “illegal” weapons begin their life as legal production and legal transfers that later divert.



From the 1960s through the 1980s, decolonization and civil conflicts increased demand for small arms and light weapons, while global manufacturing and brokerage networks matured. Trafficking did not require a single mastermind, it relied on repeatable gaps: corrupt intermediaries, falsified paperwork, weak border controls, and poorly secured arsenals. States began to build national weapons laws and licensing systems, but coordination across borders remained weak, and tracing a recovered rifle back to its diversion point was often impossible because marking, record-keeping, and data sharing were inconsistent or nonexistent.



In the 1990s, the security focus widened. With the Cold War ending, interstate conflict declined in many regions, but internal conflicts and organized crime violence rose, and small arms became the signature enabler. At the same time, trade liberalization increased cargo volume and complexity, making it easier to hide illicit shipments inside legitimate commerce. The international community responded by treating illicit trafficking as a governance problem, not only a battlefield problem. This period saw major growth in UN reporting, transparency, and cooperation initiatives on conventional arms, alongside a sharper understanding that embargoes and sanctions fail when states lack the capacity, incentives, or integrity to enforce them.



The early 2000s were the key turning point for building a global policy architecture specifically aimed at illicit small arms flows. States acknowledged that controlling production and legal transfers was not enough; they needed practical tools that operate after diversion happens: marking, tracing, secure stockpile management, and destruction of surplus. The UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons created a political framework for national action and international cooperation, while parallel efforts in transnational organized crime law strengthened the idea that trafficking networks should be pursued through investigations, prosecutions, and financial disruption, not only seizures at borders. The goal shifted from occasional interdictions to sustained pressure on the systems that make trafficking profitable.

From the 2010s onward, three trends intensified the agenda. First, conflicts in multiple regions and the growth of transnational criminal markets increased the speed at which weapons and ammunition circulate between war zones and urban crime settings. Second, supply chains became more fragmented: components, parts, and dual-use goods can be moved and assembled later, complicating enforcement that is designed around finished weapons. Third, digital communication made brokering and coordination cheaper, faster, and harder to monitor, while corruption and weak institutions continued to act as the main lubricant for cross-border trafficking. In response, international attention increased on harmonizing export controls, improving end-user verification, tightening brokering rules, and treating stockpile leakage as a preventable source problem rather than an unavoidable reality.

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda in 2015 made the link to SDG 16 explicit: reducing violence and strengthening institutions are inseparable from controlling illicit weapons flows. Trafficking both exploits weak governance and actively weakens it by financing criminal influence, undermining public trust, and escalating violence that overwhelms police and courts. That is why this history matters for your agenda. Over decades, the international community learned that stopping illicit cross-border weapons trade is not achieved by one treaty or one operation. It requires layered controls across the chain: responsible legal transfer standards, credible end-use checks, secure storage and inventory systems, consistent marking and record-keeping, real tracing capacity, cross-border investigative cooperation, and justice systems that can convert seizures into convictions and network disruption.



5. Examples of the Topic

States and institutions use different approaches to reduce illicit cross-border weapons flows, combining export controls, marking and tracing, stockpile security, border targeting, financial investigations, and regional cooperation so interdictions turn into network disruption.

In the European Union, the Schengen Information System and coordinated police and customs cooperation have supported cross-border targeting of firearms trafficking routes inside a high-mobility area. The lesson is that open borders do not automatically mean open trafficking if intelligence sharing and joint enforcement are operational, not just political.



In the Western Balkans, regional arms control roadmaps and donor-backed stockpile security upgrades have focused on reducing leakage from legacy arsenals and improving weapons collection and destruction. The lesson is that many “new” criminal weapons are actually old state stock, and reducing surplus plus improving depot security cuts supply at the source faster than chasing street-level smugglers.



In Central America, specialized anti-gang and anti-trafficking units have paired seizures with ballistics and tracing to map how weapons move from legal markets into criminal hands. The lesson is that seizures without trace analytics become trophy photos, while trace analytics can expose the recurring diversion points.



In the Sahel and parts of West Africa, joint border operations and regional coordination have aimed to interdict arms moving alongside fuel, drugs, and migrant smuggling corridors. The lesson is that weapons rarely travel alone, so anti-arms strategies work better when integrated into broader anti-smuggling intelligence and logistics disruption.

In the Horn of Africa, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs have been used to reduce the demand side by collecting weapons from ex-combatants and communities, paired with community security measures. The lesson is that stopping supply across borders is harder when local demand remains high and communities feel unprotected, so demand reduction and trust in policing matter.



In post-conflict settings, weapons marking, centralized record-keeping, and routine inventory audits inside police and military forces have been used to prevent “slow leakage” through theft and corruption. The lesson is that diversion often looks like administrative decay, and boring controls like audits and access logs prevent dramatic outcomes.

In many countries, strengthened end-user controls have included more detailed end-user certificates, no re-export clauses, and post-shipment verification visits for higher-risk destinations. The lesson is that paperwork alone is easy to fake, but verification and consequences change the risk calculus for brokers and complicit officials.

In ports and logistics hubs, risk-based cargo profiling has been used to target suspicious routes, anomalous manifests, and front-company patterns without inspecting every container. The lesson is that border control becomes effective when it behaves like intelligence work, not like a lottery.

In regions facing embargo violations, enforcement has relied on maritime interdiction, inspections, and monitoring by international mechanisms that track routes and diversion tactics. The lesson is that embargoes fail quietly when monitoring is weak, and succeed only when violations produce real interdiction and political cost.

In contexts where corruption enables trafficking, anti-money laundering tools and asset seizure have been used to follow payments, seize proceeds, and prosecute network facilitators, not only couriers. The lesson is that trafficking survives because it pays, so attacking the profit pipeline can degrade capacity faster than chasing individual shipments.

In areas with high rates of untraceable firearms, reforms have targeted licensing, safe storage requirements, and penalties for illicit modification like serial number removal. The lesson is that domestic regulation and cross-border trafficking are linked, because weak internal controls create the pool that traffickers export or recycle.

In multinational operations against organized crime, joint investigation teams have combined telecom analysis, controlled deliveries, and coordinated arrests across jurisdictions. The lesson is that trafficking networks exploit jurisdiction boundaries, so investigations must be designed to cross them, or they will always stop one step short of the organizers.



In community-based approaches along borderlands, programs that offer alternative livelihoods and build trust with local populations have reduced reliance on smuggling economies and increased tip-offs to authorities. The lesson is that enforcement alone can displace routes temporarily, but social and economic incentives determine whether smuggling regenerates.





6. Questions to be Addressed

1. How can states harmonize firearm and ammunition laws across borders so traffickers cannot exploit mismatched definitions, licensing rules, and penalties?
2. What minimum export control and risk assessment standards should apply to conventional arms transfers to reduce diversion, including end-use evaluation and human rights risk screening?
3. How can end-user certification be made harder to forge, and when should post-shipment verification be mandatory for high-risk destinations?
4. How can states track and control ammunition more effectively, including marking, record-keeping, limits on bulk sales, and secure storage requirements?
5. What marking and record-keeping standards should be required for firearms and key components to make tracing reliable across jurisdictions?
6. How can tracing systems be integrated internationally so recovered weapons quickly generate actionable leads instead of slow, fragmented paperwork?
7. How can customs and border agencies apply risk-based targeting to identify weapons shipments without crippling legitimate trade and cargo flow?
8. What specialized training and equipment should border officers receive to detect concealed weapons, components, and misdeclared cargo?
9. How should states regulate arms brokering and transit to close gaps where brokers operate across multiple jurisdictions without clear accountability?
10. How can free trade zones and transshipment hubs be governed to prevent relabeling, rerouting, and documentation laundering of weapons shipments?
11. Which legal tools best disrupt trafficking networks: higher penalties, conspiracy and organized crime statutes, financial investigations, or asset seizure and forfeiture?
12. How can anti-money laundering frameworks be used to detect and freeze payments linked to arms trafficking, including trade-based laundering tactics?
13. How can states strengthen mutual legal assistance and joint investigations so prosecutions reach organizers and facilitators, not only couriers?
14. How should countries balance counter-trafficking enforcement with protection of human rights, including limits on arbitrary detention and abuse at borders?
15. What strategies work to reduce corruption that enables trafficking, including vetting, rotation of border staff, integrity testing, and whistleblower protections?
16. How can embargo and sanctions enforcement be improved through monitoring, inspections, and consequences for violations, especially for repeat offenders?
17. How can progress be measured with clear indicators aligned with SDG 16, including seizure-to-prosecution conversion rates, diversion reduction, tracing response time, and violence outcomes?



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